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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
COLUMBIA IRON MINING COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
ra.
IRON COUNTY,
Defendant and

Case No.
Respondent,

7503

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Intervener and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Here is presented the legal question of the propriety
of the judiciary reading into an otherwise silent and
unambiguous tax statute a provision in substance as
follows:
A bona fide and reasonable contract price for the
sale of ores for a definite period, resulting in a substantial profit, and negotiated at arm's length between
the mine owner and buyer, may be disregarded for tax
purposes in the event the buyer subsequently assigns
his interest in the contract to a corporation the stock
of which, except for directors' qualifying shares, happens to be owned by a corporation which also owns
the capital stock of the selling mine owner.
1
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L
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute and concisely stated
are as follows:
1. The seller is plaintiff, Columbia Iron Mining
Company; the buyer was the United States acting
through its wholly owned subsidiary, the Defense Plant
Corporation. The contract hereafter referred to as Exhibit 1 is dated August 17, 1943; in brief it provides that
for an 18-year term Columbia will furnish described iron
ore requirements to the buyer for the operation of the
blast furnaces at Geneva, Utah, at cost plus a stated
price per ton. (R, 71) The Court below found this to
result in a profit of 25 cents per ton. (R. 95) For the
year 1948 performance of this contract resulted in "net
proceeds" to Columbia in the sum of $566,560.88. (R. 95)
2. Plaintiff was organized as an Utah corporation
in 1930. (R. 75) It owns and leases certain mining
properties and facilities within the limits of defendant
Iron County, Utah, including what is generally known
as the Columbia Iron Mine. (R. 87)
3. Since its organization and specifically since
1937, plaintiff has always reported each year to the intervenor, State Tax Commission, its "Net proceeds in
dollars" as required by Section 80-5-55(4), Utah Code
Annotated 1943, being its receipts from sales of iron ore
under its various ore contracts, including Exhibit 1, less
the specified deductions. For the years 1943 to 1947
the Tax Commission accepted such returns, but for the
year 1948, after the buyer's end of the agreement (Ex2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hibit 1) was acquired from the Government by Geneva
Steel Company, the Tax Commission substituted its own
computation of gross value of the ore per ton. Geneva
Steel Company is likewise a wholly owned subsidiary
of the United States Steel Corporation. This substitution resulted in a tax increase from $37,664.42 to $74,905.76. Plaintiff protested this substitution and on
November 26, 1948 paid the excess of $37,241.34 under
protest. (R. 96) This action to recover such protested
excess was then brought in April of 1949. (R. 7)
4. Six certain additional contracts of plaintiff for
the sale of iron ores during the time here involved are
tabulated in Exhibit B. These sales were in small
amounts, involving only 731.2 tons, and required special
handling. (R. 89) In addition to these contracts and
that of August 17, 1943 is a second "term requirement
contract" for the supply of the Ironton No. 2 blast furnace. This contract likewise was entered into with the
United States, is dated August 1, 1947, and was subsequently assigned by the United States Government to
Kaiser & Frazer Parts Corporation, which is now the
owner of that blast furnace. (R. 96)
5. Plaintiff, to expedite this case and eliminate
disputed questions of fact, has admitted for the purposes
of this case only that the substituted value figure of
$1.45 per ton invoked by the Tax Commission (in lieu
of 71c) may be treated as true, correct and proper if
the Tax Commission has the legal right to substitute
any figure for the proceeds actually received by plaintiff under its various ore contracts. (R. 95, 78, 69)
3
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6. The foregoing, being in substance the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint, were admitted by defendant and intervenor. (E. 73) These facts were then
supplemented by the following, stipulated likewise but
subject to plaintiff's objections as to materiality and
relevancy: (E. 34)
(a) Various other contracts were entered into between the United States and wholly-owned subsidiaries
of the United States Steel Corporation prior to, at the
time of, and subsequent to the date of execution of
Exhibit 1, dated August 17, 1943. These include:
(1) An agreement under date of October 31, 1941
which provided for the construction of the Geneva steel
works by Columbia Steel Company for Defense Plant
Corporation. This agreement was subsequently supplemented by various letters of intent issued by Defense
Plant Corporation covering various changes in the program, and was amended by Amendatory Agreement
dated August 17, 1943 so as to eliminate therefrom provisions relating to the leasing of the facilities to Columbia Steel Company, with the result that this agreement
then covered only the acquisition and construction of
such facilities. (E. 90)
(2) An agreement hereafter denoted Exhibit E,
executed under date of August 17, 1943 between Defense
Plant Corporation and Geneva Steel Company for the
management and operation of the iron and steel-producing facilities at Geneva, including facilities for mining
coal in Emery County, for quarrying limestone and dolomite, for sale of the products thereof, and for the gen4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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era! conduct of the business by Geneva Steel Company
for the account of Defense Plant Corporation. (E. 90,
54)
(3) An agreement of purchase hereafter denoted
Exhibit C, betwen the United States and Geneva Steel
Company effective as of midnight June 18, 1946 for the
sale of the Geneva works to the Geneva Steel Company.
(B. 93, 44) This agreement was in accordance with the
bid of the United States Steel Corporation dated May
1, 1946 for the purchase of the Geneva works including
all rights, properties and interests acquired by the Federal Government agencies in connection with the matters
mentioned in the three foregoing contracts and including the machinery and equipment owned by the Government at Columbia Iron Mine. The said bid recited
that if accepted "title will be taken by Columbia Steel
Company or another wholly owned subsidiary of United
States Steel Company/' (E. 93)
(b) The machinery and equipment at the Columbia
Iron Mine referred to in Exhibit 1 as being leased to
plaintiff was acquired by the Federal Government from
the various manufacturers of such machinery and equipment pursuant to said contract between the Government
and Columbia Steel Company of October 31, 1941 and
the amendment thereto of August 17, 1943, and such
machinery and equipment is also referred to in the
recital of Exhibit 1, being the iron ore requirement contract between the Government and plaintiff of August
17, 1943, as then "being installed at the said mines by
Columbia Steel Company''. The cost paid by the Government for this machinery and equipment, so acquired
5
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by it and placed at the iron ore mines and leased to plaintiff, was $1,350,000.00, of which $522,000.00 was expended
for items classified as "machinery and equipment", and
the balance was expended for a preliminary crusher, a
secondary crusher, a screening and loading station, utilities and sundry other buildings. (R. 91)
(c) Commencing in 1942 and continuing since the
contract of August 17, 1943 (Ex. 1) and the assignment
of this contract to Geneva Steel Company, plaintiff, in
addition to delivering the iron ore to the Geneva plant,
has also continued deliveries of iron ore to the plant at
Ironton, and has charged the same prices at which such
ores were charged on deliveries to the Geneva plant
pursuant to Exhibit 1. The Ironton plant was owned
and operated by Columbia Steel Company up to about
October 1, 1946, and by Geneva Steel Company since
that time, and plaintiff has reported gross and net proceeds on deliveries to both plants on the same basis of
charges and values as aforesaid. All iron ore treated
at the Geneva plant and at the Ironton plant during
the years 1945, 1946 and 1947 was supplied from the
Columbia Iron Mine in Iron County, Utah here involved.
(R. 89) The relative capacities of the two plants were
found by the court to be 4 to 1, although the record is
silent in this respect and the actual relative capacities
are approximately 6 to 1. (R, 92, 83)
(d) Pursuant to the foregoing bid and contract
(Ex. C and D), title to the Geneva Steel works, including
the buyer's end of Exhibit 1 and the machinery and
equipment acquired at the Columbia Iron Mine by the
Government, was acquired by Geneva Steel Company
6
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as purchaser, and thereafter the machinery and equipment acquired at the Columbia Iron Mine was transferred to the plaintiff. There was allocated to plaintiff
as a charge therefor and as a portion of the general
obligations to be paid by Geneva Steel Company and
guaranteed by the United States Steel Corporation, the
sum of $273,274.10. Thereupon, all obligations under
said contract Exhibit 1 on behalf of the buyer, including
but not limited to all obligations to furnish funds, equipment or machinery, were performed in accordance with
the terms of the contract. That is, the contract (Exhibit 1) as then outstanding between Geneva Steel Company and Columbia Iron Mining Company was reduced
by performance to the one contract provision for the
supply of iron ore to Geneva Steel plant and for the
purchase of and payment for that ore in accordance
with said contract. All other provisions of this contract as to both parties were thus terminated as provided therein, but the contract terms as recited therein
were not changed and the contract itself was not
amended. (R.94)
(e) The contract of October 13, 1941 for the construction of Geneva, including the amendment of August
17, 1943, the contract of August 17, 1943 for its operation, as well as Exhibit 1, the contract of August 17,
1943 for the supply by plaintiff of Geneva's iron requirements, were all entered into for the purpose of
furthering the war effort. The first two contracts, for
construction by Columbia Steel Company and operation
by Geneva Steel Company, were pursuant to a decision
of the United States Steel Corporation and an under7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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standing thereupon with Federal Government agencies
that the construction and operation of the Geneva Steel
plant, as covered by said contracts, would be at the
expense of Defense Plant Corporation and without loss
or profit to the United States Steel Corporation directly,
or through its subsidiaries, during the war effort. (R. 91)
Exhibit 1, the iron ore requirements contract with Columbia Iron Mining Company, in contrast is a "costplus-25 cents-per-ton" contract involving plaintiff's iron
ore supply. (R. 95)
(f) For the years 1937 to 1942 the Tax Commission
substituted for the plaintiff's contract prices a gross
value per ton in excess of the contract price established
in the agreement for the supply of iron ore for the blast
furnace at Ironton, Utah, which during that period was
owned and operated by Columbia Steel Company. The
resulting excess tax over that reported, as shown by
Exhibit A (R. 88) was paid by plaintiff under protest.
(R. 87, 88)
7. From the foregoing and over plaintiff's objections the court further found and concluded:
(a) That the three contracts between the Government and the subsidiary corporations of the United
States Steel Corporation were made in fact under the
full control of United States Steel Corporation, and the
operations thereunder were by it, operating through
its respective subsidiaries, as named in each agreement.
(R. 93) That the placing of titles to any acquired properties, and the allocation of charges, and the termination or continuance of contract covenants was by and
8
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under the complete control of United States Steel
Corporation, which alone could profit by any such, or by
any operations of its said wholly-owned subsidiaries.
(R. 94)
(b) That the statutes do not require under such
circumstances acceptance of the contract receipts as the
basis for tax computation, that the reported tax was
unjust, unequal, discriminatory and in violation of
Utah's Constitution, statutes and policy, and that the
tax imposed was fair and just and should be sustained.
(R. 97)
8. Judgment of no cause of action accordingly
was duly made and entered February 20, 1950, (R. 99)
from which plaintiff has appealed. (R. 100)

II.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED
(a) Section 4 of Article X I I I of the Utah Constitution provides that the State Tax Commission shall
assess mines " a s the Legislature shall provide;". Section 80-5-3 of the Utah Code Annotated 1943 accordingly
provides that the State Tax Commission must assess
" a l l mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous m i n e s " based on a multiple of the annual net
proceeds as provided in subsequent sections.
(b) By Section 80-5-55 the State Tax Commission
is required each year to prepare a mine assessment book
in which is to be entered " t h e assessment of all mines
9
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in the state subject to assessment by it and in which
book must be specified in separate columns and under
appropriate heads:

" (4)

Net proceeds in dollars, if a metalliferous
mine.

"(5)

Number of tons of ore mined, whether by
the owner, lessee, contractor or otherwise.

" (6)

Amount received fo<r ore and metal if sold;
if not sold the value thereof."

(c)

Section 80-5-56 as amended then provides:
" A l l metalliferous mines and mining claims,
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed
at $5.00 per acre and in addition thereto at a value
equal to two times the net annual proceeds thereof for the calendar year next preceding."

(d)

The following section, 80-5-57, then provides:

" T h e words, 'net annual proceeds/ of a
metalliferous mine or mining claim are defined
to be the gross proceeds realized during the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such
mine or mining claims extracted by the owner or
lessee, contractor or other person working upon
or operating the property, including all dumps
and tailings, during or previous to the year for
which the assessment is made
less only certain deductions therein enumerated. (There
is no question with respect to the deductions.)

10
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III.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court erred in that the amounts actually received and realized by plaintiff from the sale of its
ore under bona fide and reasonable contracts were
disregarded.
2. The court erred in sustaining and basing the
assessment of plaintiff's mine on the Commission's
conception of the gross value of the ore produced and
sold in 1947, rather than on the amount of money received
and realized by plaintiff from the sale of its ores under
bona fide and reasonable contracts.
3. The court erred in disregarding corporate entities in this instance where the original contract was
bona fide and reasonable, the price fixed therein was
reached after arm's length negotiations between nonaffiliated interests, resulted in a 25 cents per ton profit,
and was for a fixed term.
4. The court erred in concluding that for the Commission to act in accordance with the statutes and to
compute the tax on the basis of actual contract receipts
would result in an unjust, unequal and discriminatory
tax, contrary to and in violation of the Constitution,
statutes, and policy of the State of Utah, and the duty
imposed upon the State Tax Commission by these.
5. The court erred in entering judgment against
plaintiff of no cause of action.

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.
ARGUMENT
Since all of the errors assigned on the part of plaintiff relate to the same fundamental issue, they are
argued here under the following headings:
1. Exhibit 1, the contract of August 17, 1943, was
bona fide and the price therein was arrived at after arm's
length negotiations between unaffiliated interests.
Exhibit 1 is a " t e r m requirement contract" for an
18-year period whereby plaintiff is obligated to supply
the United States Government or its successor with the
iron ore requirements for the operation of the Geneva
Steel works for that definite period. It is submitted that
the contract was fair and reasonable resulting in a profit
of 25 cents per ton on a gross of 71 cents. Both parties
were satisfied with the contract and abided by its terms.
There is no suggestion in the record or any claim on the
part of defendant or intervenor of any bad faith in the
negotiations and transactions between the plaintiff and
the United States, or that the cost-plus price fixed
therein was in any sense unreasonable at the time of
execution. A similar contract executed four years later
is in effect although now assigned by the United States
to the Kaiser interests, with which plaintiff has no intercorporate relationships.
The contract was not only well within the uniform
definitions in the sales act (Title 81 of the Utah Code);
it was without question a bona fide and reasonable
agreement at the time of the execution of the agreement
between the plaintiff and the United States.
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

" 'Bona fide' is a legal technical expression ; and the law of Great Britain and this country has annexed a certain idea to it. It is a term
used in statutes in England, and in acts of assembly in all the states, and signifies a thing done
really, with a good faith, without fraud, or deceit,
or collusion, or trust. * * *A debt must be bona
fide at the time of its commencement, or it never
can become so afterwards." Ware v. Hulton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 241,1 L. Ed. 568.
" B o n a f i d e " means " i n or with good faith;
without fraud or deceit; genuine." Covert v.
State Board of Equalization, 173 P. (2) 545, 550;
29 Cal. (2) 125.
This court recently said with respect to the companion occupation tax statute, Section 80-5-66:
" W e b s t e r ' s new International Dictionary defines 'bona fide' as being 'in or with good faith;
without fraud or deceit* * *'." Combined Metals
Eeduction Co. v. State Tax Commission, (Utah)
176 P (2) 614, 616.
2. A contract which was executed in good faith, was
binding for a fixed term, and was bona fide at the time of
its execution does not lose those characteristics by reason
of subsequent events.
A contract that is bona fide when executed does not
lose that character because of events occurring subsequent to its execution. Dubuque & Sioux City R.R. Co.
v. Richmond, 86 U.S. 584, 22 L. Ed. 173.
To date it has never been argued or contended that
a contract executed between non-affiliates would not be
binding upon the Commission even though the consider13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ation to be paid for the ores might become more or less
than their market value. This is specifically illustrated
in this case in connection with the outstanding contract
with Kaiser-Frazer, and with respect to Exhibit 1 while
the Government was the contracting party. Particularly
as judged by hindsight, a mine owner might make improvident contracts; or the same result, i.e., less net
proceeds, may result from either improvident management or events beyond control. But in no such case
would the Tax Commission presume to disobey the legislative mandate.
That mandate of the legislature is pursuant to a
specific constitutional provision providing for the ad
valorem taxation of a mine on the basis of a multiple of
the net proceeds actually realized by that mine. In other
words, the Constitutional provision delegates specific
authority to the legislature to determine the details of
mine assessment methods; and the legislature has established as Utah's policy mine income as the basis upon
which to ascertain mine values.
The value of the Columbia Iron Mine is to a large
extent determined by the proceeds derived from its
products. Particularly is this true in an instance where
approximately the entire production of the mine is subject to the terms of a single contract. Certainly any
purchaser of the assets or stock of the Company would
be bound by the terms of Exhibit 1 and of the KaiserFrazer contract, and the value of the mine would be
determined accordingly. Likewise, Geneva Steel Company had a right to rely upon the terms of Exhibit 1
remaining in effect, just as any other purchaser of the
14
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Geneva Steel Plant would have taken the existence of
Exhibit 1 into effect in considering how much it would
p a y ; and as Kaiser-Frazer did in purchasing Ironton
No. 2.

.

In this case, insofar as the supply of iron ore to
Geneva and to Ironton No. 2 were concerned, the gross
price to be received was fixed after arm's length bargaining between unaffiliated interests at the time the
contracts were negotiated. This satisfied the legislative
intent, and plaintiff submits that the legislature could
not have had in mind changing the situation in the unusual event that the subsequent assignment of any such
term requirement contract, so negotiated at arm's length,
resulted in the buying end of the contract being acquired
by another affiliate of the mine owner.
Yet first this legislative prescience to anticipate
such a situation, and then this specific intent for the
particular solution here urged, would be plucked from
the air by defendant to justify its contentions and inserted by implication into Utah's statutes. But unless
such intent is clearly and convincingly evident from all
circumstances which properly may be considered by the
judiciary in determining the "legislative mind," to so
read these principles into Utah's law would be judicial
legislation.
It might just as well be contended that should any
contract prove to bring less receipts to the mine owner
than might have been obtained, the legislature would have
intended disregard of the actual receipts and silent delegation to the Tax Commission of the power to determine
values.
15
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There is here no proper key or even clue to the
legislative intent in such instances.
We quote from 50 Am. Jur. at page 212:
§ 228. Avoidance of Judicial
Legislation.—
As a result of constitutional provisions distributing the power of government among three
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, courts have no legislative authority, and
should avoid judicial legislation, a usurpation of
legislative powers, or an entry into the legislative field. It is not within the province of a
court, in the course of construction of a statute,
to make or supervise legislation. A statute may
not, under the guise of interpretation, be modified, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or
rewritten, or given a construction of which its
words are not susceptible, or which is repugnant
to its terms. The terms of the statute may not be
disregarded. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words of a statute, is to alter it,
and is not construction, but legislation. However,
words or phrases may be altered where that is
necessary to obviate repugnancy and inconsistency and to give effect to the manifest intention
of the legislature. Especially will this be done
where it is necessary to prevent a law from
becoming a nullity.
§ 229. Extension of Statute.— The general
rule is that nothing may be read into a statute
which is not within the manfest intention of the
legislature as gathered from the act itself, and
that a statute should not be construed any more
broadly or given any greater effect than its terms
require. Where the language of the statute is
clear in limiting its application to a particular
class of cases and leaves no room for doubt as
16
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to the intention of the legislature, there is no
authority to transcend or add to the statute which
may not be enlarged, stretched, or expanded, or
extended to cognate or related cases not falling
within its provisions.
If we have a clue at all to the "legislative i n t e n t "
when it enacted the net proceeds system of mine taxation, it is that the legislature until 1949 refused to act
even as to contracts initially executed between corporate
affiliate; and this though the possibility of purposeful
discrepancy between contract price and possible market
values was specifically brought to its attention in pages
21-22 of the Tax Commission's official Third Biennial
Report to the Legislature for 1935-36:
As the law now stands this company could
organize a separate corporation for the purpose
of operating the mining property. This subsidiary corporation could sell its ores to the parent
milling or smelting corporation and then the state
would be required to accept as gross proceeds the
sum which the parent corporation paid the mining corporation for its ores. Where a mining
company is a subsidiary of a milling and smelting
company, it might sell its ores to the parent corporation at a price that would tend to greatly
reduce the gross proceeds of the mine.
Since this simple device of establishing a
subsidiary corporation may be adopted, it would
be advisable to provide that the Tax Commission
could inquire into the reasonableness of the price
paid for the ores. Even if such authority were
granted to us we still would have difficulty in
executing it, because that is the work of experts,
and in almost every instance such experts are in
the employ of the major milling and smelting
companies.
17
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There are many such mining corporations
subsidiary to milling and smelting companies.
One smelting company has as many as ten subsidiary mining corporations. We do not mean to
charge that the subsidiaries were established to
further tax avoidance, but we merely point out
that tax avoidance is possible through the use
of this device.
We believe that more authority should be
granted the Tax Commission to permit it to
make full inquiry into the price received for the
ores of such subsidiary mining corporations when
they sell their ores to a parent milling or smeltins: company. An amendment should be added in
substance as follows:
" W h e r e a sale is made by a mining corporation of its ores to an affiliated corporation or
company, the burden of proving that the price
received was a fair one shall rest upon the mining corporation. For this purpose the Tax Commission shall have authority to make such investigations as it deems necessary. In the absence
of satisfactory proof that the price received is
a fair one, the Tax Commission is authorized to
determine from the best information available,
what the gross proceeds should have been from
the sale of the o r e s . "
It was after the legislature rejected its views presented above, that between 1937 and 1942 the Tax Commission imposed its own values per Exhibit A. But
the amounts were relatively inconsequential, so plaintiff
contented itself with protests until the instant case, the
Commission having accepted the contract proceeds without question for the years 1943-46 inclusive.
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This situation is in direct contrast with that in
Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax
Commission,
176 P (2) 879, where on rehearing it was shown, clearly
and convincingly to obtain reversal of the original decision, just what the legislature of Utah must have actually had in mind when it enacted the Use Tax Law in
1937. But here, until the details with respect to such a
situation were carefully and specifically outlined by the
1949 amendment, we are in the realm of speculation.
3. The contract prices under the statute were binding
upon the Commission as to value.
The statutes set out heretofore are plain and unequivocal. There is no ambiguity therein and therefore no
place for judicial construction. 50 Am. Jur. 225; New
Park Mining Co. et al., v. State Tax Commission, 196 P
(2) 485,
Utah
; Salt Lake Union Stock Yards
v. State Tax Commission, 71 P (2) 538; 93 Utah 166.
The statutory wording is that the mine value shall
be based upon net annual proceeds of the mine, defined
to be "the gross proceeds realized * * * from the sale
or conversion into money or its equivalent, of all ores
from such mine or mining claim extracted by the owner
* * *", less specified deductions.
There is no authority for the Commission to vary
this legislative mandate when for any reason it feels
that the owner might have charged more or spent less in
its operations, and so have realized more from the sale
or conversion into money or its equivalent of the mine's
ores.
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Would it be contended that if the contract prices
were more than the Commission's conception of gross
market values, the lesser figure could be used?
The Tax Commission in collecting the occupation
tax under Section 80-5-66 originally took the position
asserted here, that is, that it could substitute its own
estimate of what the mine owner should have received.
The wording of Secion 80-5-66 is slightly different, reading as follows:
The basis for computing the occupation tax
imposed by this act for any year shall be as
follows:
(a) If the ore or metals extracted is sold
under a bona fide contract of sale, the amount
of money or its equivalent actually received by
the owner, lessee, contractor or other person
operating the mine or mining claims, from the
sale of all ores or metals during the calendar
year
* .
This statute likewise is plain and unequivocal. Here,
too, is no ambiguity and therefore there is no place for
"construction" by the court. Since a direct review in
this court was possible, plaintiff at once appealed, Case
No. 7232. Whereupon the Tax Commission stipulated for
dismissal and refunded the additional tax paid under
protest, since it had been assessed on a basis other than
as provided by the legislature.
Subsequently and consistent with abandonment of
its first effort to obtain judicial legislation, the Commission submitted to the 1949 legislature and there was enacted as House Bill No. 179 the following:
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A N A C T A M E N D I N G SECTION 80-5-57,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943, RELATING TO T H E IMPOSITION OF A N E T
ANNUAL P R O C E E D S TAX AND SETTING
F O R T H T H E MANNER OF ARRIVING
AT T H E TAX LIABILITY.
Be it enacted by the Legislature
Utah:

of the State of

Section 1. Sec. 80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is amended to read:
80-5-57. The words, " n e t annual proceeds,"
of a metalliferous mine or mining claim are defined to be the gross proceeds realized during
the preceding calendar year from the sale or
conversion into money or its equivalent of all
ores from such mine or mining claim extracted
by the owner or lessee, contractor or other person working upon or operating the property,
including all dumps and tailings, during or previous to the year for which the assessment is
made ( ) ; provided, that in cases where * * *
the gross proceeds realized from the ore is disproportionate to its reasonable fair cash value,
the tax commission shall place a value on the ore
which is equal to its reasonable fair cash value,
and said amount shall be taken as the basis for
the tax. The following, and no other, deductions
may be taken \ # * *
This action (no doubt at the instance of Iron County
and the Tax Commission) could not of course effect the
pending action. This statute did not become law until
May 10th of 1949. Ch. 79, Session Laws of Utah 1949.
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4.

Authorities cited by defendant are not here applic-

able.
Anticipating reiteration of argument in this court
along the lines submitted by defendant below, plaintiff
wishes to point out that the circumstances surrounding
this case are in sharp contrast to illustrations relied
upon in the District Court.
For example, cases cited by defendant involving
delegations of specific legislative authority to the taxing
agency to substitute its estimate for contract prices, are
not here in point. An illustration would be a case now
arising under Section 80-5-57 as amended by the legislature in 1949, Chapter 79. Another such instance would
be under the occupation tax law, Section 80-5-66, as likewise amended by the Utah legislature in 1949, Chapter
80. Still another instance would be a case arising under
Section 80-5-66(b) where it is provided that in the event
of controversy with respect to whether or not particular
smelting charges are appropriate " t h e Tax Commission
shall have power to determine such rates or charges."
Likewise, under income tax law, there is specific
authority for the Tax Commission to disregard corporate entity. Section 80-12-18, for example, reads as
follows:
80-13-18.

Allocation of Income and Deductions
Between Several Corporations
Controlled by Same Interests.

In any case of two or more corporations
(whether or not organized or doing business in
this state, and whether or not affiliated) owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the tax commission is authorized to
22
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distribute, apportion or allocate gross income
or deductions between or among such corporations, if it determines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such corporations.
Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code is the Congressional grant to the Collector of Internal Revenue of
this same type of authority. But that this power even
when granted is limited and to be strictly construed, see
Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.
(2d) 508 (OCA 6th, 1940), where it was held that the
Commissioner could not create income even as between
affiliates when none in fact existed. There the Commissioner had assessed additional rental income against the
parent company on the theory that the subsidiary should
have paid the additional amount as a reasonable rental
for equiment.
p
Likewise, we are aware of the general rule and its
multitude of specific illustrations in the cases to the
effect that the corporate veil may be pierced by courts
to prevent fraud or illegality. As is said in 13 Am. Jnr.
160, Corporation®, § 17:
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal
entity existing separate and apart from the persons composing it is a legal theory introduced for
purposes of convenience and to subserve the ends
of justice. The concept cannot, therefore, be extended to a point beyond its reason and policy,
and when invoked in support of an end subversive
of this policy, will be disregarded by the courts.
Thus, in an appropriate case and in furtherance
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of the ends of justice, a corporation and the individual or individuals owning all its stock and
assets will be treated as identical, the corporate
entity being disregarded where used as a cloak
or cover for fraud or illegality.
In contrast, in the instant case there is not only no
legislative grant of authority; there is further no suggestion of fraud or illegality in connection with the original
execution of the contracts when negotiated at arm's length
between plaintiff and the United States Government. The
mere happenstance that some years later one of the outstanding contracts should be acquired by another company, which we have frankly stipulated is another wholly
owned subsidiary of United States Steel Corporation,
should not be made the excuse for judicial legislation in
an effort to acquire further tax revenue.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
lower court should be set aside, and the case remanded
to the District Court with directions to grant relief
in accordance with plaintiff's prayer and the mandate
of Utah's legislature.
Respectfully submitted,
C. C. PARSONS,
WM. M. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. B E H L E ,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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